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Democratie, incluziune si moderatie politica: lectii din miscarile religioase din Orientul Mijlociu si Indonezia

In ultimii 20 de ani, Indonezia – a patra tara cu cea mai populata tara si cea mai mare natiune cu majoritate musulmana – a evoluat intr-o democratie bazata pe toleranta si pe o interpretare moderata a islamului si a aparut ca una dintre economiile cu cea mai rapida crestere din Asia. Acest eseu face parte dintr-o serie despre „Indonezia si Orientul Mijlociu: Explorarea conexiunilor”, care examineaza natura, domeniul de aplicare si implicatiile legaturilor Indoneziei cu regiunea MENA. Vezi mai mult .. jogger porn .



 

Exista un argument de lunga durata potrivit caruia includerea in procesul politic poate modera grupurile islamiste. [1] In timp ce savantii ofera mecanisme cauzale diferite pentru motivul pentru care s-ar putea intampla acest lucru si nu sunt de acord cu ceea ce inseamna exact moderatia, ei sunt in general de acord ca includerea inseamna participarea la politica electorala. In Orientul Mijlociu si Africa de Nord (MENA), o mare parte a dezbaterii cu privire la incluziune in ultimele decenii s-a concentrat pe posibilitatea de a permite partidelor islamiste sa candideze la alegeri. tasha knox porn Introducerea cazului indonezian in discutia miscarilor islamice sugereaza insa ca notiunea de incluziune politica ar trebui extinsa dincolo de simpla politica electorala. Intrucat este dificil sa se faca generalizari semnificative despre o regiune la fel de diversa precum MENA,

Indonezia are o lunga istorie de includere a miscarilor de masa religioasa in viata politica, care dateaza pana la perioada sa coloniala. Olandezii au creat un Consiliu Popular colonial si au incurajat liderii islamici sa intre pe arena politica si sa coopereze politic [2]. Japonezii au stabilit Masyumi ca o platforma politica musulmana unificata si i-a incorporat pe conducatori atat de la Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), cat si de Muhammadiyah. messy diaper porn [3] Dupa independenta, atat miscarea traditionalista, cat si cea modernista au fost incredintate de administrarea treburilor religioase la nivel local. In perioada democratiei parlamentare a Indoneziei (1950-1957), Masyumi a fost fie formator, fie co-formatorpetrecere de patru ori, respectiv in timpul cabinetelor lui Mohammad Natsir (1950-51), Sukiman-Suwirjo (1951-52), Wilopo (1952-53) si Burhanuddin Harahap (1955-56). [4] In fiecare cabinet in aceasta perioada, membrii Masyumi sau NU au detinut unele dintre cele mai importante functii, precum prim-ministru, afaceri externe, finante, afaceri sociale, afaceri religioase, ministru de interne si agricultura [5].

Avand un cuvant de spus in afacerile sociale, religioase si chiar politice ale tarii, aceste grupuri de masa au putut sa isi dezvolte propria gandire in raport cu aceste probleme. horney mom porn Poate mai important, ele nu au dezvoltat aceste ideologii in opozitie cu statul sau ca un sistem alternativ pe care ar spera sa il implementeze intr-o zi, ci mai degraba in cadrul statului indonezian. Acest lucru a avut loc in situatia in care in timpul perioadei timpurii aceste grupuri s-au opus Pancasilei.

Unul dintre cele mai importante aspecte ale incluziunii in Indonezia este ca nu s-a limitat doar la politica electorala. In perioada autoritara a lui Suharto, NU si Muhammadiyah s-au indepartat de politica electorala, totusi au avut inca un impact asupra politicilor sociale si religioase din tara prin retelele lor extinse de moschei, madrasahuri si institutii islamice de invatamant superior. furry foot porn Dupa caderea Suharto, aceste miscari au angajat din nou statul prin mijloace electorale, dar au continuat sa-si foloseasca retelele informale pentru a avea acces la numirile politice influente.

In schimb, majoritatea statelor din Orientul Mijlociu includ referire la islam in constitutia lor si in diferite grade isi bazeaza legislatia si politicile religioase si sociale pe punctele de referinta islamice, dar nu exista niciun echivalent de a avea mai multe miscari de masa islamice care sunt consultate si incluse in politica. ceea ce face. Fratia musulmana este cea mai mare si cea mai veche organizatie islamista din regiune, fondata in Egipt de Hassan al Banna in 1928. sydney sky porn Desi nu exista nicio indoiala ca in ultimele noua decenii, Fratia a avut un impact extraordinar asupra societatii si a vietii religioase din Egipt, impactul sau a fost in primul rand prin societatea civila si nu pentru ca regimul a oferit miscarii numiri politice puternice, ministere influente sau orice modalitati de influentare a politicii, altele decat candidatii independenti la alegerile parlamentare.

In trecut, atat Fratia, cat si alte grupuri islamiste au reusit sa se infiltreze in fortele militare si de securitate, dar acest lucru a servit doar pentru a alimenta sentimentele revolutionare anti-regim, mai degraba decat pentru a favoriza cazarea intre stat si islamisti. In schimb, in ​​Indonezia nici NU, nici Muhammadiyah nu s-au infiltrat niciodata in institutiile statului, deoarece au fost implicati in procesul de luare a deciziilor inca din perioada coloniala.

De-a lungul MENA, cand grupurile islamiste au furnizat politica utilitate pentru a submina opozitia de stanga sau nationalista, regimurile le-au oferit suficient spatiu pentru a actiona si a face incursiuni in societatea civila, sindicali profesionisti, sindicate studentesti sau chiar adunari nationale. samurai porn Cu toate acestea, cand islamistii pareau oponenti periculosi din punct de vedere politic sau au apelat la tactici violente impotriva statului, regimul a folosit pumnul de fier pentru a zdrobi aceste grupuri. Primele valuri de represiune impotriva islamistilor nu numai ca au instalat o neincredere profunda a statului si o nevoie de loialitate si ierarhie a grupului, dar a creat si un dezincentiv pentru formarea altor miscari religioase bazate pe masa, limitand astfel diversitatea actorilor religiosi .

Acest lucru este evident mai ales in Egipt, unde represiunea devastatoare a Fratiei de catre Nasser a instalat un sentiment de victimitate si nevoie de loialitate si secret in randul fratilor, a limitat dezvoltarea altor miscari religioase bazate pe masa si a inspirat ascensiunea grupurilor radicale care au cautat sa reduca statul. Aceasta a lasat Fratia Musulmana sa domine mobilizarea religioasa. rylee raye porn O implicatie semnificativa este aceea ca vocile reformiste au ramas izolate de miscarile mai mari cu o fortareata in societate. In timp ce represiunea a fost folosita si in Indonezia impotriva tendintelor islamice violente, grupuri cu milioane de adepti, precum NU si Muhammadiyah, au putut sa functioneze si sa aiba o voce in politica sociala chiar si sub autoritarism.

In Indonezia, institutiile religioase au produs intelectuali moderati, care au promovat notiunea de compatibilitate intre religie si democratie. Acesti intelectuali publici au jucat un rol esential in procesul de democratizare al Indoneziei, deoarece erau conectati la organizatii religioase bazate pe masa, iar implicarea lor in societatea politica a ajutat la legitimarea institutiilor democratice si a consolidat aliantele pro-democratice. disenchanted porn [7]

Unlike in Indonesia, where mass-based religious organizations are included in social policies, in the MENA rulers have tended to co-opt religious institutions and bring them under the control of the state in order to boost their own legitimacy. In monarchies like Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan and Morocco, kings explicitly ground their legitimacy in their religious lineage. In republics like Egypt, presidents have attempted instead to co-opt prominent religious institutions like al Azhar, bring the ulama under the control of the state, and dictate religious education.

To some extent, these patterns can be traced back to the pre-independence period. amateur pregnant porn Munhanif, for instance, points out that “Egypt‘s political structure has historically tended to be characterized by a post-Ottoman elaborate, institutionalized Islamic system, combined with a relatively strong role for the ulama in state organizations.”[8] The process of subordinating the religious establishment to state authority started under Mehmet Ali, who eroded the position of ulama in society and adopted a policy of “selective patronage and subjugation” in order to lend legitimacy to his rule.[9] After independence, Nasser sought a complete nationalization of Islamic institutions.

The co-optation of religious institutions has been furthered at least in part because most MENA states have struggled to offer a coherent state ideology. daughter massage porn As Ayubi noted decades earlier, Arab states are “fierce” and often resort to raw coercion in order to preserve themselves, but they are also often weak, as they lack the ideological hegemony that would enable them “to forge a ‘historic’ bloc that accepts the legitimacy of the ruling stratum.



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”[10] The cooptation of religious institutions was a key strategy used by the new rulers to confer legitimacy upon the new regimes, and to bring religious life under the control of the state. The rise of mass religious movements that sought to reform the state represented not just the rise of a potentially powerful political opposition, but also a threat to the legitimacy of state ideology, especially after the decline of pan-Arabism.

In Indonesia, Sukarno, who encouraged the Muslim community to mobilize politically, adopted Pancasila as a state ideology because he saw it as the most feasible compromise to maintain the territorial integrity of the state and accommodate the religious diversity of the country. forced taboo porn [11] Pancasila sought to synthesize Islamic thinking with secular nationalist principles.[12]  Whereas some movements have rejected Pancasila, its widespread acceptance has conferred legitimacy upon the Republic, limiting anti-statist or revolutionary religious movements to fringe elements. After the political openings of 1998, the widespread acceptance of Pancasila has forced Islamist parties like PK to drop the call for shari’a and adopt more centrist platforms.

To be sure, inclusion and informal networks of access to power and policy-making can also have negative consequences. ender dragon porn In Indonesia, informal links between military figures and groups like Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have empowered this group, and enabled it to mobilize, shape public discourse and continue vigilantism. One can also argue that the inclusion of groups like Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) in civil society and in public discourse enables fringe radical elements to continue mobilizing support for vigilantism and violence. In terms of membership and strength, these groups fade in comparison to NU and Muhammadiyah. Yet as recent controversies around blasphemy show, fringe groups can have a powerful impact if they shape public discourse. lesbian submission porn

By the same token, a history of repression also does not preclude an Islamic organization from moderating over time, especially if given the opportunity to have access to power and policy-making. This is perhaps best exemplified by the Tunisian Ennahda, who in 2016 announced that it is no longer Islamist, but rather a party of Muslim democrats, officially separating the movement from the party.[13] So where does that leave the future of religious movements in the Middle East and Indonesia?

It may seem ironic that the trend in Indonesia is towards a growing appeal of conservative Islamic movements.[14] In a recent article, Olivier Roy concludes that “the danger is that if mainstream Islamists purchase inclusion in the secular state at the price of separating their political goals from their religious and social ones (as in Tunisia), or suffer exclusion from the state owing to their own overreach and a repressive backlash against it (as in Egypt), young Muslims seeking ‘authentic’ religious and political identities might look elsewhere. pants poop porn ”[15] While this may certainly be true, the extent to which these “alternative” movements can become more than fringe elements will at least in part depend on what formal and informal networks they can tap into.

[1] Miriam Fendius Elman and Carolyn M. Warner, “Democracy, Security, and Religious Political Parties: A Framework for Analysis,“ Asian Security 4, 1 (2008): 1-22; Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking Inclusion-Moderation Thesis,” World Politics 63, 2 (April 2011): 347-376.

[2] Ali Munhanif, “Different Routes to Islamism: History, Institutions, and the Politics of Islamic State in Egypt and Indonesia” (McGill University, 2010): 255, http://digitool. dsl porn Library.McGill.CA:8881/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id….

[3] M. freaky ebony porn C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012) 62.

[4] Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962). bambidoe porn

[5] Eunsook Jung, “Taking Care of the Faithful : Islamic Organizations and Partisan Engagement in Indonesia” (Ph,D, Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2009) 72–73.

[6] Melani Cammett and Pauline Jones Luong, “Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (May/June 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2349385.

[7] Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan. Democracy and Islam in Indonesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

[8] Munhanif, “Different Routes to Islamism: History, Institutions, and the Politics of Islamic State in Egypt and Indonesia,” 10.

[9] Anwar Alam, Religion and State (Delhi: Gyan Sagar Publications, 1998) 70-71.

[10] Nazih B. Ayubi Over-stating the Arab State (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995) 3.

[11] See his speech “The Pancasila” delivered on June 1, 1945, and “The National State and the Ideals of Islam” delivered in Jakarta on May 7, 1953, in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox Pub., 2007) 40-49; 164-170..

[12] Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 74.